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ABSTRACT 
This thesis tests the theory that nuclear proliferation might enhance strategic stability by 
making the use of military force between possessors of nuclear weapons unlikely. It discusses 
the existing literature on deterrence and nonproliferation, emphasizing the stability-instability 
paradox. The stability-instability paradox offers an alternative to the optimism of deterrence 
logic, which views nuclear weapons as a beneficial and stabilizing force, and the pessimism of 
nonproliferation, which foresees dire consequences in the spread of nuclear weapons. The 
paradox is a synthesis of deterrence and nonproliferation logic because it allows for the 
coexistence of nuclear peace and lower levels of conventional war. 
Three cases of nuclear rivalry are examined. They are the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and India and Pakistan. These 
cases provide evidence that challenges the Waltzian argument that nuclear weapons enhance 
international stability by forbidding violent response to confrontations between nuclear-armed 
states. Nuclear powers that have employable conventional forces at their disposal, a territorial 
interest at stake, and exist in a condition of nuclear stalemate can, and do, engage in 
conventional warfare. 
iii 
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I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE 
STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX 
A. INTRODUCTION 
"The difficulties in coming to grips with the implications 
of nuclear weapons are perhaps best epitomized by our 
inability to answer the straightforward question of whether 
these weapons have made the united States - and the world -
more or less secure." 1 This thesis argues that the possession 
of nuclear weapons can in select circumstances encourage, more 
than diminish, the tendency of nations to take certain 
military risks. I show that under select conditions some 
states will accept the risk of massive nuclear destruction and 
use conventional military force to achieve an objective or 
preserve an interest. A state's confidence in its ability to 
manipulate nuclear danger and control the pace of escalation 
leads to the use of military force to maintain or change a 
status quo. 2 With the common objective of avoiding mutual 
nuclear destruction, nuclear weapons can increase a state's 
willingness to use conventional military force to gain or 
protect an interest. This thesis examines three cases of 
iRobert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), p. 2. 
C Leng identifies confidence in warfighting capability as a factor in 
crisis escalation. Russel J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1890: 
Realism versus Reciprocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 
112. Competitive risk-taking is examined in Hermann Kahn, On Escalation: 
Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Thomas C .. Schelling, 
Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1966). 
1 
military conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries: the 
United States versus the Soviet Union from 1948 to 1980, The 
people's Republic of China versus the Soviet Union from 1964 
to 1969, and India versus Pakistan from 1948 to the present 
day. These case studies reveal the conditions under which the 
use of conventional military force between nuclear adversaries 
becomes a viable option. 3 For the purpose of this thesis, 
conventional military force refers to any type of military 
force that does not involve nuclear weapons. Modes of warfare 
thought of as unconventional, like guerrilla warfare, satisfy 
the definition. 
B. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
1. Existing Theory 
"It is true that most wars are perpetrated by states 
who want something they do not have rather than by states that 
are content to defend what they already have. ,,4 Modern states 
use military force to insure security, acquire material gain, 
achieve influence, claim status, and assert ideological 
supremacy.5 This thesis is concerned with the conditions 
'Luttwak explores three generic strategies that states employ to counter 
nuclear weapons. They are circumvention (avoiding the political preconditions 
for nuclear weapons use), emulation or competition (matching the creation or 
status of a nuclear arsenal), and countermeasures (engaging in means to defeat 
nuclear weapons). Edward N. Luttwak, "An Emerging Postnuclear Era?" The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol 11, No.1 (Winter 1988), pp. 5-15. 
·Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, and Justice 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 11. 
'Ibid., p. 9. 
2 
under which nuclear-anned adversaries use conventional 
military force. 
The strategic and military effects of nuclear weapons 
proliferation and conflict can be described in two contending 
arguments, the logic of deterrence" and "the logic of 
nonproliferation. ,,6 Nuclear deterrence theory stresses the 
stabilizing and beneficial impact nuclear weapons have on 
relations between nuclear powers. 7 In deterrence theory, 
stability between nuclear-armed states sterns from the threat 
of mutual nuclear punishment. Theoretically, the more nuclear 
powers in existence the more stable the international 
environment. Duncan and snidal identify the fundamental 
deterrence problem as the use of threats to induce an opponent 
to behave in desirable ways. The simplest model involves two 
rational actors, the initiator and defender, whereby the 
defender attempts to prevent the initiator from taking some 
action by presenting a credible threat to respond to the 
~Of the two concepts, deterrence logic fulfills the requirements to be 
considered a theory. It is a testable construction of assumptions. 
Nonproliferation logic does not fulfill the requirements to be considered a 
theory. It is a collection of observations. For the best effort to forge 
nonproliferation logic into theory, see Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of 
Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons," International Security, Vol. 18, No.4 (Spring 1994), pp. 
66-107. 
7Bernard Brodie articulated the classic notion of nuclear deterrence. 
"Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win 
wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose." Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: 
Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76. Waltz 
applied Brodie's concepts of nuclear deterrence to the problem of nuclear 
proliferation. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread Of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be 
Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171, London: International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1981. 
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aggres s ion with punishing military action. 8 In deterrence 
theory, the use of military force by states armed with nuclear 
weapons is unlikely. 
Nonproliferation logic expects an increase in the 
probability of nuclear weapons use through the expansion of 
the number of nuclear powers. It identifies weaknesses in 
deterrence logic and emphasizes the unstable environment 
between new nuclear states. Nonproliferation logic expects no 
meaningful change in the use of conventional military force 
and an increased probability of nuclear weapons use. 9 
Cornmon ground between nonproliferation and deterrence 
logic is rare. In general, the two concepts are incompatible. 
The stability-instability paradox, the notion that strategic 
nuclear stalemate raises the likelihood of conventional 
military violence, offers the expectation of a third outcome. 10 
The paradox represents the possibility that the "mutual fear 
of big weapons may produce, instead of peace, a spate of 
smaller wars. "II It describes how nuclear-armed aggressors may 
~Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and 
Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, Vol. 41, No.2 (January 1989), pp. 
150-152. 
9Many nonproliferation advocates expect an increase in conventional 
military violence in the form of preventative or pre-emptive wars against the 
emerging nuclear capabilities of an adversary. Sagan, "The Perils of 
Proliferation," pp. 74-85. 
If'The stability-instability paradox was first presented in: Glenn Snyder, 
"The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury, ed., The 
Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp. 184-201. Also see 
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), pp. 29-34. 
IIKenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), p. 236. 
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challenge the interests of nuclear-armed defenders and how the 
latter may respond. The stability-instability paradox 
identifies weaknesses of nuclear deterrence theory by 
emP0asizing the alternatives to cataclysmic nuclear war. It 
predicts the means of conflict when states fail to deter. 12 
If both states subscribe to the notion that a nuclear war 
cannot be fought to a meaningful victory and believes their 
opponent thinks similarly then military risk below the 
threshold of nuclear war becomes more probable. Conventional 
conflict can occur precisely because of the power of nuclear 
deterrence, a probability over looked by deterrence theory. 
This thesis describes the conditions necessary for the paradox 
to operate and applies them to the case studies. 
2. Hypothesis 
This thesis examines one aspect of the argument that 
nuclear proliferation enhances strategic stability by 
inhibiting the use of conventional military force between 
possessors of nuclear weapons. This thesis demonstrates that 
under select circumstances conventional military force remains 
an option for nuclear powers in dispute. The stability-
instability paradox predicts that the fear of mutual nuclear 
devastation makes the use of such weapons less probable than 
conventional alternatives. The conditions for the paradox to 
leThe paradox does not imply a failure of deterrence theory but 
identifies conditions in which deterrence policy can fail. "The theory 
actually predicts some breakdowns. When deterrence fails because the 
retaliatory threat is absent, incredible, or less valuable than the prize, the 
theory has forecast perfectly." Duncan and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence 
Theory," pp. 152. 
5 
operate are that both states must exist in a condition of 
strategic nuclear stalemate. Strategic nuclear stalemate is 
not construed to mean a parity in the quantity or quality of 
nuclear weaponry but rather a condition in which both sides 
believe they are incurring some risk of nuclear retaliation, 
and that the other side believes the same. Both states must 
also have employable conventional forces that can challenge or 
defend an interest. l3 Finally, the interest at stake must be 
a contiguous piece of terri tory on the periphery of each 
state. The peripheral contiguous territorial dispute implies 
that the interest at stake is tangible and sufficiently 
important for both sides to assume the risk of nuclear weapons 
use. The Soviet Union versus China, and India versus Pakistan 
are examples of conflicting territorial interests that 
resul ted in the use of some level of direct conventional 
military force. In contrast, the predominantly ideological 
challenges between the United States and Soviet union 
developed into conventional proxy wars or political crises but 
never evolved into the direct clash of each state's 
conventional military forces. Peripheral contiguous terri tory 
is land whose incorporation is desirable but may not be 
"Huth and Russett have done extensive work in the field of deterrence 
failure and the role of nuclear weapons in supporting deterrence. Deterrence 
is likely to succeed when the short term balance of usable conventional forces 
favors the defender. The long-term balance of conventional forces and the 
possession of nuclear forces make little difference. Paul K. Huth, Extended 
Deterrence and the Prevention of War, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1988); Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 No.1 (1988), pp. 29-45; Paul K. Huth, the Extended 
Deterrent value of Nuclear Weapons," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
34, No.2 (June 1990), pp. 270-290. 
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regarded as absolutely essential to the continued survival of 
the either state. 
The central assertion of this thesis is that 
peripheral territorial disputes between nuclear-armed states 
will result inconventional military clashes providing 
conventional military forces are available and a condition of 
nuclear stalemate exists. 14 
The three variables suggest a possible rationale for 
the use of conventional force between nuclear-armed 
adversaries. Strategic nuclear stability, the degree to which 
a state is unwilling to use or be the victim of nuclear 
weapons, can create conventional military instability by 
making lower levels of violence seem safer to pursue. States 
existing under conditions of mutual nuclear vulnerability 
should ideally strive to avoid nuclear destruction. Nuclear 
weapons may facilitate the decision to resort to conventional 
violence by providing an absolute upper limit to the gains an 
aggressor may make and the costs a defender needs to concede. 
Under most circumstances a state will not risk the use of 
nuclear weapons as the cost of retaliation is too exorbitant 
to bear. Among nuclear powers, the downside risk, the 
absolute worst possible outcome of a dispute, is the actual 
use of nuclear weapons. A measure of control over the 
I~Again, conventional war for the purpose of this thesis is a mode of 
violent conflict that excludes only nuclear weapons. State sponsored 
terrorism or paramilitary operations are construed as being under the aegis of 
conventional war despite their less than orthodox tactics. 
7 
downside risk is one of the benefits of a mutual nuclear 
capability. This control, however, is not absolute. Conflict 
between nuclear powers increases the opportunity for mutual 
destruction through accident, misperception, or deliberation. 
Brinkmanship on the nuclear level may be acceptable in 
relation to expected gains or incurred costs. In most 
situations the threat of nuclear weapons insures that the risk 
is unacceptable. Challenges will not be initiated or 
interests will not be defended. This factor and that there 
are comparatively few nuclear states in the international 
system may account for there being so few cases that the 
stability-instability paradox can be applied too. 
A stumbling block in the use of conventional military 
force between nuclear adversaries is the role of nuclear 
threats. Why would a state choose conventional military force 
over the issuance of direct and sincere nuclear threats? The 
risk of a reciprocal response partially answers that question. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study reviews the pertinent literature on deterrence, 
nonproliferation, and the stability-instability paradox. It 
identifies the critical factors necessary for the paradox to 
operate and then applies them to the case studies. Alexander 
L. George's "method of structured, focused comparison" is used 
to compare the three case studies. The technique is "focused 
as it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the 
8 
historical case and structured because it employs general 
questions to guide the data collection and analysis in that 
historical case. ,tiS The availability of information on the 
decisions and capabilities of some states varies considerably. 
Information on the nuclear history of the united States is 
well documented, the Soviet union less so. Information on 
China, India, and Pakistan is even more rare. 
1. General Questions 
Answering a specific set of questions in a case 
comparison study ensures the acquisition of comparable data. 
The questions considered in this study are oriented around the 
three variables that effect the stability-instability paradox. 
Again, these variables are identified as the conventional 
military capability of a state, its nuclear weapons capability 
and the interest that is being challenged and defended. 
The questions asked are as follows: 
~ What were the interests at stake in the conflict? 
~ Did both sides exist in a condition of strategic 
nuclear stalemate? 
~ Did both sides have conventional forces at their 
disposal? 
~ How did these states contend with gaining or 
protecting contested interests under a nuclear 
threat? 
~ How did nuclear weapons influence the pattern of 
conflict between the two countries? 
1.IAlexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method 
of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul, Gorden and Lauren, ed., 
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, And Policy (New York: The Free 
Press, 1979), pp. 61-62 
9 
2. Case Selection 
The cases examined represent the universe of cases of 
conflict between nuclear-armed powers .16 They are necessarily 
abbreviated to conform to the constraints of this thesis. 
a. The United States and the Soviet Union, 1948-1980 
During the Cold War the United states and the 
Soviet Union dealt cautiously with each other, however, the 
deterrent value of nuclear weapons did not prevent the 
occurance of peripheral wars that each side supported. 
Indeed, one of the effects of nuclear weapons may have been to 
push conflict away from a state's core interests towards the 
periphery. This case will examine the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 
1973 October war, and the 1980 Iran crisis. These examples 
are intended to provide a cross section of nuclear crises over 
time and under the aegis of different deterrent doctrines. 
The primary purpose of this case is to illustrate how the 
conflict between the United states and the Soviet Union is 
fundamentally different from the subsequent cases in this 
study. The United States and the Soviet Union were 
acknowledged nuclear powers and had ample conventional forces, 
I"There are other possible cases. China's military presence in the 
Vietnam war could have been construed to be a proxy war between the United 
States and China. For China's presence in the Vietnam war see: Allen S. 
Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1975) pp. 170-223. The 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese war could be interpreted as a proxy war between China/Cambodia and 
the USSR/Vietnam. In the 1956 Suez crisis the Soviet Union issued nuclear 
threats against the United Kingdom and France. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek 
Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 
172-175. The Arab-Israeli wars may have a direct nuclear link between the 
USSR and Israel. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear 
Ars~nal and American Foreign Policy, with a new afterward (New York: Vintage 
books, 1993), p. 17. 
10 
however, there was no threat to the territorial integrity of 
either state. wi thout this threat there was insufficient 
reason to resort to the direct use of military force. 
b. The soviet Union and The People's Republic of 
China, 1964-1969 
In 1964, the year that China detonated its first 
atomic bomb, China began a concerted attempt to alter the 
border between itself and the Soviet Union. The level of 
border violence increased over time and peaked with the 
Damasky Island clashes in 1969. This is the first instance of 
nuclear-armed states involved in direct military conflict. 
Soviet border force improvements, nuclear missile deployments 
in the far east, and direct nuclear threats to the Chinese 
ensured that the possibility of nuclear weapons use did not 
escape the minds of decision makers on either side. 
c. India and pakistan, 1947-present 
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since 
becoming sovereign nations in 1947 and nearly fought again in 
1987 and 1990. Their primary dispute is over the portion of 
Kashmir held by India. India and Pakistan are frequently 
involved in mid- to low-intensity conflict energized by 
ethnicity, nationalism, and ideology. Nuclear weapons have 
not offered sufficient incentive to refrain from low-level 
provocation. 17 
17It is sufficient that both adversaries have, or behave as if they have, 
deliverable nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan fit the latter category. 
They are "opaque proliferators" in which a nuclear weapons capability is 
11 
II. DETERRENCE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE 
STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies the two primary arguments that 
describe the strategic effects of nuclear weapons 
proliferation and the stability-instability paradox. The 
logic of deterrence stresses that superpower success at 
mutual deterrence will repeat itself among emergent nuclear 
powers. The logic of nonproliferation contends that the 
Cold War history of nuclear deterrence was contextually 
unique and that nuclear deterrence in the future will be 
problematic. The two concepts are incompatible. The 
stability-instability paradox offers the possibility of a 
third way between the two competing thoughts. It asserts 
that the fear of large nuclear wars allows states to engage 
in smaller conventional ones. 
B. THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE 
Deterrence theory is based upon the assumption of a 
unitary rational actor attempting to maximize his choices in 
response to the opposition's preferences and options. The 
assumed rather than declared. The concept of "opaque nuclear proliferation" 
was first introduced in: Benjamin Frankel, "Notes on the Nuclear Underground," 
The National Interest, No.9 (Fall 1987). Other essays dealing with this 
phenomenon can be found in Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, eds., "Opaque 
Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications," Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No.3 (September 1990). 
12 
theory provides that when conflict can result in nuclear 
annihilation a rational decision maker will be deterred from 
a course of action that incurs that risk. Inescapable mutual 
vulnerability to nuclear attack ensures that nuclear risk is 
unavoidable. When nuclear weapons cannot be countered or 
preempted with absolute certainty neither actor can pursue 
goals the other is committed to protecting with nuclear force. 
Mutual vulnerability and the awesome destruction of 
nuclear attack makes the connection between the Cold War's 
"long peace" and nuclear weapons plausible. 18 Stability 
between nuclear powers as a result of nuclear weapons is the 
central tenant of the logic of deterrence. 19 In deterrence 
logic the overwhelming destructiveness of nuclear weapons 
renders the prospect of a future multipolar nuclear 
environment tolerable. 20 
'"John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the 
Postwar International System," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and 
After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991). Jervis, The 
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. pp. 34-35. Mueller argues that the 
increasingly destructiveness of conventional war renders nuclear weaponry 
irrelevant as a stabilizing factor. John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance 
of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," International Security, 
Vol 13, No.2 (Fall 1988), pp. 57-79. 
19Kenneth Waltz is the most noted proponent of the stabilizing effects of 
nuclear proliferation on the international system. See: Kenneth N. Waltz, The 
Spread Of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Other works that contribute to 
the theory include Bruce Bueno de Mequita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment 
of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 26, No.2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306; John J. Weltman, 
"Managing Nuclear Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 6, No.3 
(Winter 1981/1982) pp. 182-194; John J. Weltman, "Nuclear Devolution and World 
Order," World Politics, Vol. 32, No.2 (January 1990), pp. 169-193. 
COKenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure Of International Politics," 
International Security, Vol. 18, No.2 (Fall 1993), p. 74. The relative 
contributions of bipolarity and nuclear weapons to the absence of great power 
war is contested. See: Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The 
Free Press, 1988), pp. 267-290; John J. Mearshiemer, "Back to the Future: 
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Adherents to the logic of deterrence maintain that nuclear 
deterrence exercises a powerful restraining influence on state 
actors. States contemplating the use of nuclear force are 
deterred from aggression for fear of reciprocating punishment. 
With the assumption that this cautionary influence is 
universal, in time, mutual deterrent postures should develop 
in areas of the world prone to violent clashes. 21 Deterrent 
logic expects that no rational actor can embark on a direct or 
incremental course of action that would result in nuclear 
destruction. The imperative of survival is to strong. 
Nuclear deterrence in its purest form grants a state 
immense power to preserve its core interests but no capacity 
to usurp the interests of others in the face of a reciprocal 
threat. In a mutually deterrent condition, logic dictates 
that there are no forceful means of achieving an objective 
that an adversary is committed to opposing. The potential 
costs far outweigh any conceivable gains. 
1. Punishment, Existentialism, and Defense 
Deterrence is operationalized through two modes, 
deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. The 
difference between the variants is subtle. "An absolute sharp 
distinction between the punishment and denial functions [of 
Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. IS, 
No.1 (Summer 1990), pp. 13-18; Stephan Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe 
after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. IS, No.3 (Winter 
1990/1991), pp. 36-40; Ted Hopf, Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and 
War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No.2 (June 1991), pp. 475-
490. 
:IWeltman, "Managing Nuclear Multipolarity," p. 190. 
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deterrence] cannot be made, nor can either function be 
attributed exclusively to any particular kind of force."22 
Deterrence by punishment is primarily, though not 
exclusively, the province of nuclear weapons. It is 
predicated upon inflicting unacceptable damage upon an 
aggressor. Punishment renders differences in nuclear arsenal 
size and technical sophistication inconsequential within a 
wide range. Nuclear punishment operates by having sufficient 
weapons to destroy the opposition's cities. This is an 
absolute capability rather than a relative one. 23 In its most 
extreme form deterrence through punishment implies no 
defensive capability against aggression. It's intent is to 
influence an aggressor's intentions and decision-making 
processes rather than to defeat his actions. 
Existential deterrence is an extreme variant of 
punishment based deterrence in which deterrence is derived not 
from the physical capability destroy but through the 
psychological consequence of the existence of nuclear 
::Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, Research 
Monograph No. 1 (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, January 2, 
1959), p. 1. 
~Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No.4 (Winter 1979-80), p. 618. 
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weapons. 24 Existential deterrence is attractive because, 
the deterrent effect is almost wholly impervious to 
the location and capabilities of nuclear weapons 
and the doctrines that would notionally govern 
their use. All that is required is the 
availability of some nuclear weapons that could be 
used in anger. 25 
Deterrence by denial, or defense, is predicated on 
frustrating or denying an aggressor's obj ecti ves. Denial 
deterrence is primarily, though not exclusively, achieved 
through the use of conventional forces. Punishment is 
secondary to the purpose of defense in that it is an 
incidental quality achieved through the ability to defend 
oneself. Deterrence by denial is not usually associated with 
nuclear weapons. 
C. THE LOGIC OF NONPROLIFERATION 
1. Structural and Environmental Criticisms 
Any criticism of the logic of deterrence naturally 
supports the logic of nonproliferation. 26 There are two broad 
~"Existential deterrence was first described by McGeorge Bundy, 
"Existential Deterrence and its Consequences," in Douglas Mclean, ed., The 
Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (Totowa: Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1984): pp. 3-13. See, also: Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of 
Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security, Vol. 10, 
No.1 (Summer 1985), pp. 137-163; Devin T. Hagerty, "The Power of Suggestion: 
Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms 
Competition," Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 258-
260. 
~For a critique of existential deterrence, see Lawrence Freedman, "I 
Exist; Therefore I Deter," italics in original, p. 184. 
~Rebuttals to proliferation optimism are, Karl Kaiser, "Non-
Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence," Survival, Vol. 31, No.2 (March/April 
1989), pp. 123-136; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of 
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areas of criticism of the logic of deterrence. The first 
concerns itself with the internal weaknesses of the theory and 
the second deals with the unique strategic environment in 
which deterrence has worked in the past. 27 
a. Structural Criticisms 
Some adherents of deterrence logic assert that 
deterrence is a "metaphysical concept that has near-universal 
applicability, transcending all cultures and politics ,,28 
Nonproliferation logic holds that deterrence is defined by 
"unique experiences of particular societies at one moment in 
history rather than by universal laws. ,,29 Nations may have 
unique cultural and political experiences that preclude the 
acceptance of mutual nuclear vulnerability and western 
definitions of rationality.30 The acceptance of deterrence in 
which populations are hostage is difficult to accept. In the 
Nuclear Operations," Security Studies, Vol 2, No. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993); 
steven E. Miller, "The Case against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3 (Summer 1993), pp. 67-80; Steven R. David, "Why the 
Third World Still Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 
1992/93), pp. 127-159. 
c7Scott Sagan has created an organizational approach to deterrence theory 
in which parochial military interests override objective state interests. His 
argument is a composite of the structural and environmental weaknesses of 
deterrence theory. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: 
Organizational theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," 
International Security, Vol. 18, No.4, (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107. 
cXWilliam C. Martel, "Deterrence after the Cold War," in Stephan J. 
Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman, Controlling and Ending Conflict, Issues Before 
and After the Cold War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 54. 
c'iIbid., p. 54. 
~~uliet A. Swiecicki, "Severing The Ties That Bind: Moving Beyond 
Deterrence," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 11, No.3 (July- September 1992), p. 
290. 
17 
United States, deeply held moral, psychological, and rational 
factors bar complete acquiescence to deterrence theory.31 The 
unique experiences of other states and cultures may more 
thoroughly prevent the acceptance of the western concept of 
deterrence. 
Deterrence theorists have failed to delineate the 
boundaries of rational choice. 32 "When a challenger makes a 
decision to use or not to use force with reference to criteria 
outside of deterrence theory - such as domestic or alliance 
politics then the validity of deterrence theory is 
doubtful. ,,33 States may resort to war for reasons other than 
external threat. Pressures to preserve the internal status 
quo may cause deterrence failure that is wholly disconnected 
from the perception of external threat. 
Deterrence theory has failed to explicate the 
conditions for success. Initiation theory demonstrates the 
loopholes in deterrence theory and sets the requirements for 
its failure. 34 Initiation theory's basic postulate is that a 
:;iGeorge H. Quester, "Cultural Barriers to an Acceptance of Deterrence," 
in Roman Kolkowicz, ed., The Logic of Nuclear Terror (Boston: Allen & Unwin 
under the Auspices of the University of California Project on Politics and 
War, 1987), p. 82-106. 
3CRichard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: 
I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics, Vol. 41, No.2 (January 1989), p. 
217 . 
"Ibid, p. 212. 
'"Initiation theory was first described by Alexander L. George and 
Richard Smoke. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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nation desirous of changing the status quo generally has more 
than one option to do so. Any deterrent effort that fails to 
address all the options at a challenger's disposal is 
inherently incomplete and prone to failure. In initiation 
theory deterrence can fail by degree. This incremental 
failure can assume one of three general types: the fait 
accompli, in which a defender is challenged to undo what has 
been done; the limited probe, a reversible military action; 
and controlled pressure, a military or political test of 
resolve. 
b. Environmental Criticisms 
Criticisms of deterrence theory based upon 
environmental conditions are viscerally persuasive, yet are 
essentially a collection of disjointed observations and 
untested assumptions. These criticisms attempt to qualify the 
environment that new nuclear states will exist in. Despite 
the anecdotal nature of the evidence that constitutes 
environmental criticisms, its importance is derived from the 
fact that new nuclear powers will interact within a more 
complex international structure. 35 
In nonproliferation logic, third world security 
environments are so profoundly different from the central 
balance of the Cold War that the likelihood of successful 
1974), p. 519-548. 
35For a prognostication of conflict in a proliferated environment, see: 
Martin Van Crevald, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1993). 
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deterrent relationships forming is minimal. 36 Third world 
states are typically smaller, closer, and more densely 
populated than the united States and the Soviet Union. 37 The 
absence of strategic depth makes the immediacy of the threat 
and vulnerability to attack significantly higher. The grave 
consequences of losing territory by force may create offensive 
or preventative war strategies. The third world may "perceive 
the threat to be so high, some of these countries' leadership 
may be ready to risk nuclear confrontation, if not a 
surprisingly high level of nuclear damage, in pursuit of their 
obj ecti ves . ,,36 
Economic and technological constrains limit the 
size, sophistication, and reliability of new arsenals and 
their support systems. Command and control systems will 
reflect the degree of threat a state perceives, the resources 
the state has available, and the state of civil-military 
~A comprehensive picture of third world conflict can be found in: Donald 
M. Snow, Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). A summary of wars fought since 1945 can 
be found in: Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide 
to World Conflict since 1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). 
J7The issue of "tight-coupling" is addressed in: Sagan, "The Perils of 
Proliferation," p. 99. 
~Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982), p. 69-70. "The meaning of a country's weapons is determined more by its 
policy than by the technical characteristics of its weapons." Colin S. Gray, 
Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, & Military Technology (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993), p. 9. Sagan's organizational 
approach highlights the proclivity of military organizations to fight a 
preventative war. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation," pp. 71-85. 
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relations. 39 The technical capacity, geo-political context, 
and decision-making apparatus of newly nuclear countries will 
greatly effect the quality and safety of new weapon systems. 40 
The safety of new nuclear arsenals assumes a level 
of technology and experience that may not be available in the 
third world. 41 One example is the highly unstable nature of 
Iraq's nuclear weapon design, a design described as being 
inevitably on the verge of going off. 42 The potential for 
misuse of nuclear weapons also has a greater chance of 
occurring in a state that has limited experience with the high 
degree of interactive complexity inherent in nuclear weapons 
systems. 43 The safety and security of new nuclear weapons is 
further complicated by the opacity of the process. 44 Covert 
construction and deployment prevents verification of safety 
"JFor a discussion of command and control systems of emergent nuclear 
powers, see: Peter D. Feaver, Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear 
Nations," International Security, Vol. 17, No.1 (Winter 1992-93), p. 160. 
-l(JDunn, "New Nuclear Powers," p. 6. 
JIKaiser, "Non-proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence", p. 127; Bruce G. 
Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institute, 1993). Sagan asserts that newly nuclear state's arsenals will be 
crude and likely stay that way for a longer period of time. Sagan, "The 
Perils of Proliferation," pp. 99. 
J~Gary Milhollin, "Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb," New York Times 
Magazine, March 8, 1992, p. 32. 
JJS ee Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and 
Nuclear Weapons {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).Interactive 
complexity is numerous interrelated, yet unplanned interactions which are not 
readily comprehensible. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation," p. 95. 
JJOrganizational and technical reasons suggest that opaque proliferation 
methods are inherently less safe. Tight compartmentalization, lack of public 
debate, and the prohibition of full scale tests inhibit safety efforts. 
Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
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measures, placing doubt on the reliability and utility of 
untested weapons. 
Nuclear preemptive or preventative strikes may be 
more likely among new proliferants. 45 Poor early warning 
systems, limited reaction time, cornmon borders, and 
preexisting tension endemic to the third world mandates a high 
degree of readiness and possibly launch on warning responses. 
The proximity of the threat and the smaller amount of targets 
that need to be accounted for may lead to increased estimates 
of success to fight a pre-emptive or preventative war. An 
accidental strike in response to a false alarm is a 
possibility and the parallel proliferation of ballistic 
missile technology means that a weapon launched cannot be 
recalled. 
New nuclear states might engage in regional 
adventures under the aegis of a nuclear force. The presence 
of nuclear weapons may have changed the coarse of many of the 
most recent conflicts. The Falkland Island's invasion and 
Iraq's seizure of Kuwait could have been successful fait 
accomplis had these nations possessed nuclear weapons. Newly 
nuclear states could use their weapons to exclude great powers 
from intervening in regional affairs. 
·'Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Iran and Prospects for Nuclear War in the 
Middle East," Strategic Review (Spring 1993), p. 52-60; Sagan's "inward-
looking" military governments may be predisposed to preventative wars. Sagan, 
"The Perils of Proliferation." pp. 66-107. 
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D. THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX 
The stability-instability paradox allows for a third way 
between deterrence and nonproliferation logic. The paradox 
states that, "if neither side has a 'full first-strike 
capability,' and both know it, they will be less inhibited 
about initiating conventional war, and about the limited use 
of nuclear weapons, than if the strategic balance were 
unstable. ,,46 The case studies support the paradox under a 
narrow range of conditions and exclusive of its provision for 
limited nuclear strikes. The conditions hypothesized as 
necessary for the paradox to operate are a strategic nuclear 
stalemate, a peripheral territorial dispute, and employable 
conventional forces. Strategic nuclear stalemate implies that 
neither side is willing to risk nuclear weapons use and 
believes the other thinks the same. Lower levels of violence 
become possible because there is no credible basis for nuclear 
weapons employment. 47 
A peripheral territorial dispute implies that the interest 
in conflict is sufficiently important for both sides to fight 
over but not enough to risk mutual nuclear suicide. 
Territorial interests are sufficient provocation to result in 
~~The original quotation is framed by the United States extended 
deterrent commitment to defend Western Europe from Soviet aggression. Glenn 
H. Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," Paul Seabury, 
ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), p. 
199. 
~7The usability-credibility paradox is discussed in Avner Cohen, 
"Deterrence, Holocaust and Nuclear Weapons: A Nonparochial Outlook," Louis 
Rene Beres, ed., Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy, 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 173-190. 
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the employment of some level of military force. Ideological 
and political commitments are not enough to result in the 
direct use of conventional forces between nuclear opponents. 
Employable conventional forces means that the conflicting 
states have credible coercive means other than nuclear weapons 
at their disposal. Strategic nuclear stalemate destabilizes 
the balance between states and shifts the determinants of 
stability towards the conventional balance. 48 In the paradox, 
a conventional war-fighting strategy complements a nuclear 
deterrent strategy.49 However, the possibility of escalation 
between opposing nuclear-armed states is always unavoidable. 
The interest at stake, the forces available, and the 
credibility of their employment provide some limits to the 
level a conf lict can escalate too. Factors such as poor 
judgement, flawed perceptions, and common recklessness can 
escalate a conflict. 
~'''Strategic stalemate does shift military competition to the tactical 
level. But one must add what is usually omitted: nuclear stalemate limits the 
use of conventional forces and reduces the extent of the gains one can seek 
without risking devastation. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political 
Realities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No.3 (September 
1990), p. 739. 
~')Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence in the New Strategic Environment," 
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 11, No.3 (July-September 1992), p. 261. Waltz 
disagrees. " ... in a nuclear world a conventional war-fighting strategy would 
appear to be the worst possible one, more dangerous than a strategy of relying 
on deterrence." Waltz, "Nuclear Myths," p. 739. 
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III. THE COLD WAR: THE U. S. AND 
SOVIET NUCLEAR RIVALRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section examines the nuclear rivalry and the use of 
force between the united States and the Soviet union. Three 
crises will be examined during different periods of United 
States nuclear strategy. They are the 1948 Berlin crisis 
during massive retaliation, the 1973 Middle East war during 
the phase of assured destruction and flexible response, and 
the 1980 Iran crisis during PD-59's countervailing doctrine. 
This chapter demonstrates that the ideological foundation 
that best describes the Cold war was inadequate cause for 
conventional conflict. Intangible interests are an 
insufficient rationale for war between nuclear powers. 
Concurrently, a defender's nuclear strategy or superiority 
have no bearing on the issuance of a challenge. Each of the 
examples occurred under the aegis of a unique strategic 
doctrine and yet a challenge was still tendered. Interests 
at stake while politically or ideologically important were 
not peripheral territorial interests. Berlin and the Middle 
East, while politically important were not territorially 
linked to either the United States or the Soviet union. 
Their loss, while not inconsequential, was not threatening 
to the integrity of either state. 
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B. NUCLEAR STRATEGY DURING THE COLD WAR 
1. Massive retaliation and the 1948 Berlin Blockade 
The synthesis of domestic pressures for 
demobilization, international challenge in the form of rising 
Soviet hostility, the technical state of the art, and 
President Truman's conception of nuclear weapons forged the 
doctrine of massive retaliation. 50 The military and political 
consensus that emerged was that nuclear weapons could balance 
the shortfall of conventional military forces. 51 
Initially, obsessive secrecy shrouded united State's 
nuclear weapons, so much secrecy, that they were held separate 
from other American military forces, however, enough was known 
of their capabilities that they were conceived of as weapons 
of last resort. 52 The threat to use nuclear weapons in the 
face of conventional provocation, suited the United States 
during 1948 Berlin Blockade. The strategic position of the 
United States dictated that in the event of hostilities with 
the Soviets, "strictly conventional war was never seriously 
considered to be an option. ,,53 Nuclear weapons would be needed 
~In June of 1945 the United states had more than 12 million under arms. 
Two years later there were only 1.5 million military personnel. Gar 
A1perovitz and Kai Bird, "The Centrality of the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No. 94 
(Spring 1994), p. 14. 
51"Betts, Nuclear Blackmail, p. 26. 
5CDavid Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and 
American Strategy 1945-1960," In~erna~ional Securi~y, Vol. 7, No.4 (Spring 
1983), p. 11. Tight civilian control of nuclear weapons and a subservient 
military are one of Sagan's preconditions for stable deterrence to evolve. 
Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation," pp. 81-85. 
5'Betts, Nuclear Blackmail, p. 24. 
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to check the Soviets superior conventional weapons forces and 
geographic advantages. 
This crisis, the first Cold war challenge and the only 
one in which the united States would enjoy absolute nuclear 
preponderance, began the process of erosion of the utility of 
nuclear weapons. Despite the united State's nuclear advantage 
the Soviet union was not deterred from attempting to force the 
united States to cede its position in Europe by blockading the 
land route into Berlin. "The Western Allies did not directly 
challenge the ground blockade; instead, they hastily organized 
an airlift of supplies to West Berlin."s4 
Early weapons and delivery systems were cumbersome. 55 
Modified B-29' s were the only means of delivering atomic 
weapons. Their ability to penetrate into enemy territory was 
uncertain and the valuable weapons, developed in ever 
increasing yields, were designated for only the most 
impressive targets. without a credible conventional military 
presence, the United States implicitly threatened the Soviets 
with nuclear weapons by announcing the movement of 60 B-29's, 
the premier u.S. strategic bomber, to Great Britain. 56 The B-
29 deployment forced the Soviets to consider the possibility 
'·George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy," p. 108. 
""In the fall of 1948, for example, the United States had about 100 
bombs, but the early bombs took two days to assemble by a team of twenty-four. 
"Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," The Atlantic, Vol. 
250, No.5 (November 1982), p. 82. 
'~In mid-1948 only one air force unit, the 509th Bomb Group, with its 32 
planes, was nuclear capable. None of the 8-29's moved to Berlin were from the 
509th. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail, p. 28. 
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of a nuclear response to their conventional threat. with the 
effectiveness of their blockade mitigated by the massive 
airlift and the united states willingness to engage in 
escalatory spiral, the Soviets relented. 
2. Assured Destruction, Flexible Response and the 1973 
Middle East Crisis. 
Improved technology and growing Soviet nuclear menace 
turned the united State's strategic thought process to 
counterforce options and the creation of a secure second 
strike capability. 57 Growing U. s. vulnerability set the stage 
for the competing doctrines of flexible response and assured 
destruction. Flexible response offered a range of limited 
nuclear and conventional options tailored to a specific 
threatening action. It's intent was to provide flexible 
strategies requiring a fraction of the striking power needed 
for assured destruction. Assured destruction was predicated 
upon the deterrent power of mutual nuclear devastation. 58 
While the Kennedy administration officially adopted 
assured destruction, it supplemented assured destruction with 
"discriminating counterforce options ,,59 Powerful conventional 
)7Defense secretary Thomas Gates said, "We are adjusting our power to a 
counter force theory. We are not basing our requirements on just bombing Russia 
for retaliatory purposes." Desmond Ball, "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," 
Adelphi Papers No. 185, (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Summer 1983), pp. 6. 
)'McNamara believed the United States and Soviet Union attained mutual 
assured destruction in 1968. Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 544. Henry 
Kissinger concluded in 1970 that there was little evidence that the Soviets 
subscribed to MAD. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons, p. 378. 
)~Betts, Nuclear Blackmail, p. 97. 
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forces and limited nuclear options were designed to complement 
the ability to escalate to mutually suicidal levels. Assured 
destruction would safeguard the United States from a Soviet 
nuclear attack and flexible response would counter Soviet 
adventurism abroad. 60 
This doctrinal synthesis was tested during the 1973 
war in the Middle East when Israeli forces had effectively 
defeated Syria and encircled the Egyptian Third army. The 
Soviet union as the principal arms supplier and political 
supporter of Egypt and Syria hinted at United States and 
Israeli collusion in the destruction of their clients and 
began preparations to unilaterally intervene. 61 
On the 24th of October a united Nations Security 
Council drafted a resolution calling for a joint superpower 
force to disengage the Egyptians and Israelis. Citing the 
danger of superpower forces in such close proximity, the 
united States rejected the suggestion. Communications from 
the Soviet Union and confirming intelligence sources revealed 
that the Soviets were prepared to take action on Egypt' s 
behalf. Soviet airborne divisions were alerted, air and sea 
W"Because the balance is so stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, 
each side is relatively free to engage in provocations and military actions at 
lower levels of violence." Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't 
Matter," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No.4 (Winter 1979-80), p. 619. 
6lKissinger, Diplomacy, p. 737 i Richard Nixon, RN, The Memoirs of Richard 
Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), Vol. II, p. 495. 
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transports were loaded and a special airborne command post 
established. 62 
"Rather than matching the Soviets 'Tit-for-Tat,' the 
secretary [Kissinger] believed, it was necessary to do 
something more dramatic, something that would get the 
attention of Soviet decision-makers because it was several 
times more alarming than their own action." 63 Before the reply 
was delivered, the alert state of the united State's military 
was advanced to Defcon III, the 82nd airborne was prepped for 
movement, additional aircraft carriers were deployed to the 
Mediterranean, and B-52 bombers were surged from Guam to the 
United States. 64 On the 25th of October Israel halted 
offensive operations and reluctantly allowed humanitarian 
convoys to reach the beleaguered Egyptian forces. This 
concession effectively ended the rational for Soviet 
intervention and de-escalated the growing crisis. 
3. Nuclear Warfighting and the 1980 Iran Crisis 
"Kissinger's National Security Study Memorandum-3, 
requested the day after Nixon's 1969 inauguration was designed 
~The United State's Navy claims to have tracked a Soviet cargo ship, 
bound for Alexandria, that emitted neutron radiation. This indicates the 
possibility of Soviet nuclear weapons deploying to Egypt. William B. Quandt, 
"Soviet Policy in the October Middle East War," International Affairs (London) 
Vol. 53, (October 1977), pp. 596-597. 
MBlechman and Hart, The Political Utility Of Nuclear Weapons'" p. 145. 
NHenry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 587-589. 
The United State's reply stated that "we must view your suggestion of 
unilateral action as a matter of gravest concern, involving incalculable 
consequences." Reference was made to the 1973 agreement on the prevention of 
nuclear war. Nixon, RN, Vol II, pp. 498-499. 
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to 'kill assured destruction' and establish the need for 
limited nuclear options and escalation control. ,,65 The 
National Security Decision Memorandum-242 and the Nuclear 
Weapons Employment policy Guide-I implemented counterforce 
strategies. President Carter reaffirmed this doctrine with 
Presidential Directive-59 which introduced a countervailing 
strategy.66 This strategy represented a convergence with long 
held Soviet theories of nuclear war.67 Not only would Soviet 
strategic capabilities be targeted but their mechanisms of 
state control and communications. 68 PD-59 emphasized the 
ability to fight a nuclear war by enhancing United State's 
capabilities rather than influencing Soviet intentions. 
PD-59's test began less than a year after the 1979 
invasion of Afghanistan when there were indications that the 
Soviet union was prepared to attack Iran. Large scale 
unannounced military exercises, strengthened ground combat 
units, the use of war reserve frequencies, and redeployed 
1>5Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American 
National Security: Policy and Process, 4th ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), p. 237. 
('('The Soviet military response to PD-59 was to renew emphasis on the 
preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in 
Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), p. 63-
64. 
(,7Joseph D. Douglas, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Conventional War and 
Escalation: The Soviet View (New York: Crane & Russak, 1981). 
~PD-59 incorporated an ethnic component to its targeting strategy. The 
logic was that it would speed the destruction of the Soviet state. For a 
discussion of the ethnic dimension of nuclear targeting see the account of a 
high level meeting with Zbigniew Brzezinski discussing Presidential Review 
Memorandum 10's Annex C, "Military Strategy and Force Posture Review," in 
which he queries a briefer as to the military requirement to kill Russian 
Russians. Powers, "Choosing a Strategy," p. 86. 
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fighter-bomber units were actions "unprecedented since the 
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia." 69 
After evaluating the evidence, Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the 
available options. The JCS responded that the united States 
had no conventional military option available to prevent the 
Soviets from seizing the warm water ports and oil fields of 
Iran. 
In order to deter Soviet movements into the Persian 
gulf, B-52 bombers flew "reconnaissance" missions in the 
Arabian sea. The bombers, inappropriate for a reconnaissance 
mission, were intended to dissuade Soviet movements. In mid-
September, approximately one month after the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff discussed the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets stood 
down from their unprecedented state of readiness. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, nuclear deterrence between the United States 
and Soviet union held, however, each found reason and method 
to engage each other in military tests of will. The logic of 
deterrence is validated because neither side went to war. Its 
internal flaws are revealed because there was still room to 
initiate challenge. The Berlin crisis established a measure 
of disutility of nuclear weapons that became more acute after 
~Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Was the u.s. Ready to Resort to Nuclear Weapons 
for the Persian Gulf in 1980?" Armed Forces Journal International, Vol 124 
(September 1986), p. 93. 
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the Soviets had emulated the United States nuclear 
achievement. Subsequent provocations moved closer to central 
uni ted State's interests as the Soviets became adept at 
establishing a baseline of provocation tolerable to the United 
States. In effect, no nuclear strategy was sufficient to 
deter the initiation of a crisis. The ultimate significance 
of these cases is that they delineate the requirements for the 
use of force between nuclear adversaries by demonstrating when 
there is, and is not, sufficient provocation for war. 
The closer explanation can be detailed in the context of 
the stability-instability paradox. In each of these crises 
geography, logistics, and domestic politics made the injection 
of credible amounts of conventional forces problematic at 
best. If these places were to be defended against an actual 
attack, nuclear weapons would almost certainly have to be 
used. Each side existed in a condition of nuclear stalemate. 7o 
The most compelling link between these crises, through 
changing nuclear doctrines and shifts in relative nuclear 
capability, is the interest at stake. Each of these conflicts 
were over predominantly intangible ideological interests 
rather than any significant territorial issues. For the 
United States to lose Berlin or the Middle East would be a 
71)In the Berlin crisis, Truman's personal conception of the weapons, 
their relative rarity, and general unwieldiness offered a reasonable 
substitute for a condition of nuclear stalemate. 
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terrible political and ideological tragedy, but it could not 
be translated as an immediate and dire threat to the core of 
the united States. 
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IV. THE 1964-1969 SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Sino-Soviet border dispute demonstrates that nuclear-
armed states can engage in direct conventional conflict. The 
conditions set forth in this thesis for the operation of the 
stability-instability paradox are fulfilled. Both states had 
sufficient concern to fear nuclear damage. The Soviet Union 
had a modern diversified nuclear force and the People's 
Republic of China had the beginnings of one. Both states had 
plentiful conventional forces in the contested region and 
mechanisms for rapid reinforcement. Most importantly, they 
were in contention over territory, a vastly more important 
concern than ideology. 
Standard interpretations of the crisis emphasize the civil 
disarray of the cultural revolution, declining relations with 
the Soviet union or Lin Bao usurping the will of the state. 71 
None of these explanations factor he development of the 
Chinese bomb. In 1967, three years after China detonated its 
first atomic weapon, the relatively bloodless border incidents 
71 Lin Bao issued General Order Number One, ordering Chinese troops to be 
prepared for an impending Soviet invasion. Stephen Uhalley, Jr. and Jin Qiu, 
"The Lin Bao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 
66, No.3 (Fall 1993), pp. 386-398. 
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escalated into a "vicious circle of tit-for-tat reprisals. ,,72 
The Chinese were the principal challengers and the Soviets 
were the principal defenders of the status quo. 73 
A concerted Chinese policy of probing Soviet resolve to 
preserve the border is a logical explanation. 74 The intensity, 
and duration of the crises indicate a deliberate policy. 
Nuclear weapons afforded China the security to credibly 
threaten a former patron and superpower. 
B. PRECURSORS TO DETERRENCE FAILURE 
1. Chinese Experience 
There are two general precursors of deterrence failure 
between the Chinese and the Soviets. 75 Chinese experience 
which forged its strategic perceptions and the nuclear weapons 
which afforded its security. The decline of China in the 
nineteenth century resulted in its exploitation by Russia and 
other European powers. China's loss of territory and 
diminished capacity to effect international events has had a 
nThomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, 
Development, and the March 1969 Clashes, RM-6171-PR (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1970), p. 21. 
73Some tactical actions contained within the overall conflict may have 
been initiated by the Soviets. Ibid., pp. 72-74. 
74Robinson disagrees, suggesting that the Chinese were not following a 
preconceived plan in the incidents that they instigated. Ibid., p. 7. 
~Griffith argues that deterrence did not fail. Existing Chinese nuclear 
forces could not be employed against the Russians with any reasonable amount 
of certainty and Soviet retaliatory attacks forced a successful Soviet 
ultimAtum UPOI! th~ Chin~~@. WilliAm Griffith, Th@ World ~nd th@ Gr@~t POW@T 
Triangle (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), p. 4. 
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powerful effect on its strategic perspective. With some 
justification, China has come to regard itself as being 
isolated and surrounded. 76 Russia' s acquisition of vast tracts 
of Chinese land, which has never faded from Chinese memory, 
establishes the historic precedent for military confrontation 
between the two states. 
While border incidents are recorded as far back as 
1959, a deliberate pattern of confrontation did not appear 
until 1964, the year China exploded its first atomic bomb. 
Skirmishes and ambushes resulting from aggressive patrolling 
over disputed lands, "initiated history's only recorded 
incident of conventional combat between nuclear-armed 
nations. ,,77 For the first time ever the world was presented 
with bordering nuclear-armed states with irredentist claims. 
While the rudimentary Chinese nuclear capability could not 
destroy the Soviet Union, it could "tear a limb from the 
Soviet beast." 78 
2. Chinese Nuclear Proliferation 
The treatment China suffered at the hands of outside 
powers contributed significantly in the creation of it's 
atomic weapons program. 79 The program's primary purpose was 
~Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random 
House, 1987), p. 447. 
77Setts , Nuclear Blackmail, p. 79. 
7XIbid., p. 126. 
N For a comprehensive argument on the causes of Chinese nuclear weapons 
acquisition, see Avery Goldstein, "Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: 
Theoretical Explanation and China's National Experience, "Security Studies, 
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to strengthen the nation's defenses to meet a serious security 
threat and in October 1964, China succeeded in detonating an 
implosion-type uranium weapon. 80 
The Chinese military formed plans to use strategic 
weapons almost immediately.8l The development of a few megaton 
sized weapons supported a minimum deterrent posture that hoped 
to disproportionately influence the perceptions and decisions 
of China's enemies. 82 
C. SOVIET AND CHINESE RISK-TAKING 
The SinO-Soviet border incidents exhibited, "striking 
demonstrations of determination and caution by both sides," 
which included "ground combat operations and real nuclear 
threats. ,,83 The border conflicts did not erupt spontaneously 
but reflected the declining relations between China and the 
Soviet Union, the conflicts with Maoism and Soviet Communism, 
and increas ing Chinese military power. "Both sides were 
extremely careful, and no single encounter lasted more than a 
matter of hours, but neither side could be certain of the 
prudence of the other, and each was certainly aware of latent 
Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993) pp. 213-243. 
~John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 2, 121. 
~IIbid., p. 131 
~:Ibid., pp. 193, 197, 216. 
"Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 525. 
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nuclear danger." 84 Despite the presence of nuclear danger and 
superior Soviet military capacity the Chinese took advantage 
of rough local military parity and initiated conflict over 
territory. 
1. Border Conflict 
Military encounters along the border began as early as 
1959 and paralleled the general decline of Sino-Soviet 
relations. 85 Secret negotiations and escalating public 
rhetoric brought no concessions from either power. On 
September 26, 1964, less than a month before the Chinese 
nuclear test, talks over territorial issues between the two 
nations broke off. The two powers would not meet at the 
negotiation table again until after the Damasky Island 
clashes. 
The greater strategic picture affecting each state 
dictated the assets they could deploy against each other. The 
Soviets were preoccupied with Europe and the Chinese were 
distracted by events in Indochina. In response to the Chinese 
nuclear test, the Soviet's improved the qualitative measure of 
~4Ibid., pp. 530-533. 
~5China demanded that the soviets declare the treaties of 1858 and 1860 
as unequal, recognize that borders along the Ussuri and Amur rivers are in 
dispute, and that they withdraw from the area. David Rebs, "Soviet Border 
Problems: China and Japan," Conflict Studies, No. 139, 1982, pp. 4-5. Michael 
Speltz details the economic and security considerations that complement the 
political reasons that prevent the Soviets from acquiescing on Chinese border 
claims, see: Michael J. Speltz, "Chinese Territorial Claims on the Soviet Far 
East," Military Review, Vol. 65, No.8 (August 1985), pp. 63-72. Nicholas 
Kristof describes China's contemporary territorial aspirations as "fairly 
reasonable" and that "any country in such a position would yearn to recover at 
least some of its land." Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol 72, No.5 (November/December 1993), p. 70; Robinson, The Sino-
Soviet Dispute, pp. 7, 13n. 
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their border forces. In 1966 they did so again along the 
Mongolian and river borders and added nuclear rocket forces to 
the calculus. 86 strategically the conventional and nuclear 
military balance overwhelmingly favored the Soviets. 87 This 
was insufficient to deter the Chinese who enjoyed localized 
tactical advantages in some positions. Up until 1967 the 
disputes were little more than minor incidents of harassment 
with few if any casualties. After 1967, the border incidents 
became more provocative. The increasingly provocative 
competitive patrols confused the Soviets, confirming their 
impression of Chinese irrationality and unpredictability.s8 
The Czech crisis and improved surveillance 
capabilities prompted a Chinese reevaluation of Soviet border 
strength and intent. 89 After the reevaluation, the risk of war 
was increased by placing the People's Liberation Army in an 
~ti . IbLd., p. 27-28. 
'7"At the earlier date (1967), Soviet Military capabilities against the 
Chinese were already very considerable, but only at the extreme ends of the 
spectrum of war: in border skirmishing on one hand, and in general nuclear 
bombardment of cities on the other. In between these extremes, the Soviet 
Union's actual ability to wage (non-nuclear) war upon China was quite small." 
Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1983), p. 96-97. 
"The Soviets, "were astonished and greatly disturbed at what they 
regarded as the incomprehensible temerity of the Chinese in accepting--and in 
some cases, provoking, armed combat with a greatly superior opponent." Harry 
Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China, R-
2943-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand corporation, 1982), p. 31. 
~Two months after the Czech invasion, "PRC officials moved from total 
silence on the threat of a Soviet invasion to explicit, authoritative alarms 
keyed to this specific contingency. The Chinese denounced the invasion, 
accused the Soviets of violating their own border integrity and linked Soviet 
"revisionism" with invasion. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of 
Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1975), p. 237-239; Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 533. 
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aggressive forward posture which resulted in direct conflict 
between two nuclear powers. 90 
The Sino-Soviet clash on March 2, 1969 is evidence of 
Chinese willingness to incur high risk in reaction to 
perceived threat. Despite Soviet warnings that further 
intrusions would be met with force, 100 Soviet troops were 
ambushed by nearly 300 Chinese troops at Damasky island. 
Tension along the border quickly peaked with both armies going 
into an increased state of readiness. 91 On March 15, in a 
better prepared battle, border forces engaged using artillery 
and armor. Battle preparations were more complete, engaging 
forces were larger, the duration longer, and losses 
correspondingly higher. This indicates a certain degree of 
premeditation on the behalf of both sides as opposed to the 
unilateral Chinese ambush on March 2 and the ad hoc nature of 
combat in the preceding years. 92 
<XIWhiting, The Chinese Calculus, p. 236. 
9lRobinson, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, p. 33 
~Conflict after the March 2 incident was probably initiated by the 
Soviets as part of their plan to drive the Chinese to the bargaining table. 
Kissinger believes that the Soviets may have been the more probable culprit in 
some if not all of the other border incidents. His conclusion is derived from 
a detailed border map which showed that, on May 20 and June 10, clashes on the 
Sinkiang border were only a few miles from a Soviet railhead but hundreds of 
miles from a Chinese one. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 177, 185. 
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D. SOVIET AND CHINESE DETERRENCE 
1. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence 
For the Chinese, the best deterrence is belligerence -
military force must be employed to be credible and if 
success is not at hand try again but more SO.93 The Chinese 
assumption that the Soviet union was unwilling to accept the 
possible consequences of a war with China contributed to the 
outbreak of border violence. 94 A significant component of the 
situation is the Chinese development of nuclear weapons. 
While nuclear weapons were officially disdained, their awesome 
destructive power and ability to influence one's enemies to 
behave with a degree of caution was recognized. 
2. The Soviet Calculus of Deterrence 
The Soviet strategy was to bolster their credibility to 
preserve their borders up to the use of nuclear weapons. 95 The 
Soviets decided that they could not exhibit weakness in the 
face of aggression and initiated a strategy designed to 
convince the Chinese to come to peaceful terms or prepare for 
an escalated conflict. The Soviets were then faced with the 
choice of a quick decisive attack, possibly including nuclear 
weapons, or a prolonged border war in a period of increased 
~Whiting, The Chinese Calculus, p. 202. 
9-lGelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup, p. 34. 
9'The Soviets advertised the deployment of additional forces, cited 
previous examples of Russian invasions of Asia and communicated direct nuclear 
threats. Gelman, The Soviet Far East Build, pp. 34-40 
42 
European pressures. 96 UI timately, the Soviets decided to 
reinforce their conventional operations with nuclear threats. 
a. Nuclear Threats 
Soviet threats to preempt Chinese nuclear facilities 
could not wholly eliminate the danger that China could 
respond. 
would be 
The Soviets believed that nuclear threats alone 
effective without conventional indications of 
resol ve. The Soviet decision to use nuclear threats in 
conjunction with conventional action sterns from the 
understanding that Maoist thought discounted the utility of 
nuclear weapons in combat and respected conventional-
attritional war and territorial occupation. 
The threats were issued from a variety of sources. In 
March 1969, a Chinese language broadcast by the Soviet's Radio 
Peace and Progress warned, "the whole world knows that the 
main striking force of the Soviet Armed forces is its rocket 
units" and that in a missile engagement the Chinese, "would 
certainly end up in defeat. ,,97 Several months later the Deputy 
head of the Strategic Rocket forces became the commander of 
the Far East Military District and Pravda reported that a 
Sino-Soviet war would involve, "lethal armaments and modern 
means of delivery. ,,9B Soviet threats were also promulgated 
through the west. A Soviet diplomat reportedly asked the 
%Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. 66-68. 
nGelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup, p. 37n 
%Ibid., pp. 37-38n. 
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State department how the United States would respond to a 
Soviet attack against Chinese nuclear assets. This prompted 
a meeting of the Washington Action Group to prepare 
contingency plans for a Sino-Soviet war. Later, a Central 
Intelligence Agency press briefing mentioned the possibility 
of strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities. The final 
nuclear threat was the publication of the probability of a 
Soviet Strike on Lop Nor, China's nuclear test site, in the 
Western press. 99 
Chinese reaction to the nuclear threats was to make 
frequent public reference to Soviet nuclear blackmail, missile 
deployments, and the possibility of surprise attack. This 
reflected a genuine leadership concern .100 Chinese dissuasion 
efforts made no mention of their own nuclear capability and 
implied only that any attack would become a long-term land 
war. 101 
By early October 1969, the Chinese backed down. They 
agreed to reopen negotiations and denied they were trying to 
reclaim lost territories. A sumrni t level meeting between 
Prime Minister's Kosygin and Chou En Lai at the Peking airport 
formally halted active hostilities. 
'NBetts, Nuclear Blackmail, pp. 80-81; Henry Kissinger, White House Years 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 183-185; Gelman, The Soviet Far East 
Buildup, p. 40. 
''''Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup, pp. 43. 
IIIIIbid., pp. 43n. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The stability-instability paradox, the predilection for 
conventional war between nuclear opponents, operated as 
predicted in this case. The conditions set forth for the 
paradox were fulfilled. Both states had a nuclear capability, 
available conventional forces, and a territorial enterest. 
The border war demonstrated the ability of nuclear-armed 
states to initiate direct conventional conflict if a 
territorial claim is at stake. Research indicates that 
conflict is rooted in territorial concerns far more than it is 
in political ideals. Violence is more likely if the territory 
exchanged is contiguous and regarded as home territory .102 
Geographic contiguity of territory is a prime variable for 
resorting to violence. 103 The material stakes in direct 
physical assault upon territorial integrity is far greater 
than an ideologically driven conflict waged in a third state. 
The rough equivalence of Chinese and Soviet conventional 
forces theoretically should of preserved deterrence. The 
Chinese enjoyed superiority of numbers while the Soviets held 
the technological and logistical edge. Soviet nuclear and 
general conventional superiority did not intimidate the 
Chinese enough to fore go aggression. The Chinese exploited 
IOCPaul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, "Territorial Changes and Militarized 
Conflict," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No.1 (March 1988), p. 
120. 
1IDStuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the 
Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 26, No.2 (June 1992), pp. 309-338. 
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the local balance of power when they thought they enjoyed an 
advantage. 
This case would indicate that nuclear weapons are not a 
universal deterrent. China felt reasonably confident that by 
placing the soviets under reciprocal threat, as diminutive as 
it was, it could not only avoid nuclear attack but win back 
some of its lost territories. The eventual Soviet seizure of 
the initiative and greater latitude for conventional 
escalation probably did more to dissuade the Chinese from 
pressing their claim than the nuclear threats. 
What the stability-instability paradox does not do is 
specify a particular outcome. 
under pressure, maintain the 
Ei ther state can acquiesce 
status quo, or escalate the 
conflict. The paradox only states that conventional conflict 
is possible. 
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V. THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR RIVALRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details the nature of conflict on the 
subcontinent and applies it to the stability-instability 
paradox. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry is a good test of the 
stability-instability paradox as both states have engaged in 
direct conflict before and after the assumed advent of a 
nuclear weapons capability. The Indo-Pakistani wars reflect 
an increased capacity to inflict decisive and lasting damage 
until the advent of nuclear weapons. After assuming the 
status of nuclear-armed states, large conventional war gave 
way to less provocative forms of conflict. Enduring guerrilla 
conflicts and threatening mobilizations have become the normal 
mode of conflict on the sub-continent. The paradox permits 
India and Pakistan to accept a level of violence that normally 
would be a prelude to conventional war. Nuclear weapons have 
created a reasonable amount of caution between the two 
adversaries but have left sufficient room for provocation. 
B. WAR ON THE SUBCONTINENT 
1. The First Kashmiri War, 1947 
War on the subcontinent has a long history. The First 
Kashmiri war was one of the consequences of the Indo-Pakistani 
partition. Partition did not provide the political security 
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that both states required and left a violent legacy of 
unresolved irredentist claims and ethno-religious 
antagonisms. l04 When the states of India and Pakistan were 
inaugurated on August 15, 1947, the Princedom of Jammu and 
Kashmir at the northern apex of the sub-continent emerged as 
an "unattached political entity with an uncertain future. ,,105 
The geographic scope of the first conflict was limited to the 
Jammu and Kashmir state. It was the longest but the least 
costly in terms of both men and material. At the conclusion 
of the war both sides could make a respectable claim for 
victory. Pakistan acquired approximately one third of the 
disputed state and India retained the vale of Kashmir, the 
most economically significant portion of the disputed 
terri tory. 106 Minimal casual ties, tactical restraint, and 
reluctance or inability to escalate characterized the first 
war, however, it would do little to moderate the vehemence 
each felt for the other. The war officially registered and 
reinforced the separate territorial claims. 
2. The Second Kashmiri War, 1965 
The period between the first two wars was one of 
tension and low-level border clashes that were interpreted as 
IWFor an overview of the partition, see: Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, 
"Kashmir, India and Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No.3 (April 1965), 
pp. 528-535. 
IOOAlice Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 
3, No.1 (January 1949), p. 31. 
'O('Ganguly, The Origins of War, p. 18; Alice Thorner, "The Kashmir 
Conflict," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 3, No.2 (April 1949), p. 170. 
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disparate and isolated instances rather than a directed policy 
by either state. In January 1965, the Rann of Kutch, a 
strategically and economically marginal land on India's 
northwestern border became the sight of frequent and 
escalatory Pakistani border incursions. Indian unwillingness 
to escalate the Rann incursions and poor performance in the 
Indo-Chinese war in 1962 gave the appearance of weak political 
and military determination to preserve its borders. 107 The 
second war expanded beyond the disputed territory into each 
other's mutually acknowledged domain. It was of greater 
intensi ty and scope than the first, featuring the use of 
airpower, massed tank battles, and artillery duels. 
3. The Bangladesh War, 1971 
Pakistani political mismanagement, ethnic separatism, 
and harsh repression in East Pakistan lead to massive refugee 
flows into India that precipitated the Bangladesh war. Under 
severe social and economic strain from the refugees, India 
invaded East Pakistan on the pretense of Pakistan's "indirect 
aggression. ,,108 The last of the official Indo-Pakistani wars 
was of greater scope and magnitude than the previous two. It 
introduced large-scale ground invasion, the use of naval 
forces, and two distinct theaters. The Pakistani strategy of 
107Sumit Ganguly, "Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani war 
of 1965," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No.4 (December 1990), p. 
81. 
IOXRichard Sisson and Leon E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakist.an, India, 
and the creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), p. 190. 
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projecting power from west Pakistan could not prevent the 
isolation of its eastern territory. This last war was the 
most costly in terms of the men, material, and interests lost. 
The Indo-Pakistani wars reflect an increasing capacity 
for destructive violence. Conflict between the two states 
exhibited a technological progression from localized guerrilla 
insurgencies to mechanized multi-theater operations. In terms 
of casualties and territory exchanged the wars show a greater 
abili ty to threaten each others vi tal interests. As the 
capacity for violence increased, the ramifications of 
deterrence failure became much more serious. The ability to 
introduce conventional forces into battle is a demonstrated 
fact and these wars indicate that this capability has improved 
over time. 
4. Territorial Incentive 
The principle cause of deterrence failure between 
India and Pakistan is the territory of Kashmir and the 
symbolism that is attached to it. Kashmir is a tangible 
symbol of divergent social visions and internal legitimacy of 
each state. 109 Integration of Kashmir by either state is seen 
as an important bulwark against further fracturing along 
diverse cultural lines .110 The first two wars were fought 
'09The founding rationale for India, Democratic Secularism, built a 
constitutional premise that all cultures could thrive under a democratically 
elected government. Pakistan committed itself to Islamic theology as the 
basis for statehood. Its assertion was that the Moslem minority would never 
achieve just representation in an India union. 
""Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," Foreign Affairs, Vol 69, No. 
S (Winter 1990-91), p. 60-61. 
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explicitly for the territory of Kashmir, the third only 
indirectly so. Both states valued Kashmir as gateway to 
greater influence in Central Asia and for the strategic depth 
it provides. The unexplored but assumed economic resources of 
the territory provided additional incentive to acquire the 
territory. 
C. SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE 
1. Motivations 
Indian concern over the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 
prompted the 1974 Indian "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion." This 
in turn generated a Pakistani assumption of an Indian nuclear 
weapons capability directed primarily against them. 1ll 
Pakistan's 1971 dismemberment and conventional inferiority 
provided the motivation to start its own nuclear weapons 
program. 112 
Each states nuclear capabilities are camouflaged 
behind an intricate web of covert and overt proliferation 
methods .113 Both countries have gone through extensive efforts 
'"Stephen Phillip Cohen, The Pakistani Army, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 153. Cohen asserts that while India and Pakistan 
influence each others nuclear programs they are not "racing." Stephen Phillip 
Cohen, ed., "Nuclear Neighbors" in Stephen Phillip Cohen, Nuclear 
Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), p. 4-6. 
II:Pakistan's nuclear stance and approach to nonproliferation is 
explained in General Mirza Aslam Beg, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: A National 
Security Perspective," unpublished paper, no date, pp. 1-28 .. 
"'The Mechanics of the proliferation process are discussed extensively 
in: Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); 
David Albright, "India and Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Race: Out of the Closet But 
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to acquire the knowledge and material to build nuclear 
explosive devices. Each have significant and increasing 
quantities of unsafeguarded fissionable materials and 
sophisticated tactical aircraft capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons. Both countries have the incipient capability to use 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles .114 The creation of a 
deployable minimal deterrent capability is well within their 
capabilities .115 
The nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan is more 
complex and deliberately ambiguous than other cases of 
nuclear-armed rivalries. The comparison between the Indo-
Pakistani and the united States-Soviet rivalry is a 
simplification of the dynamic at work on the Asian 
subcontinent. llo Neither country admits to a nuclear weapons 
capability, has a publicized doctrine, or a visible command 
not in the Street," Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, No.5 (June 1993), pp. 12-16. 
II-lIndia is developing two ballistic missiles, the Prithvi, with a range 
of 250 km and Agni, with a range of 2,500 km. Pakistan is also developing two 
ballistic missiles, the Hatf I, with a range of 80 km and the Hatf II, with a 
range of 300 km. "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat," A 
Report of the Strategic Defense Advisory Committee, (October 1992), pp. 18-19. 
II.lFormer Indian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General K. Sundarj i openly 
advocates a minimum deterrent posture for India. He asserts that a finite 
deterrent will result in stable relationships with China and Pakistan. Rodney 
W. Jones, "Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in Southern Asia after the 
Cold War," The Washington Quarterly, Vol 15, No.1 (Winter 1992), p. 120. 
II~John J. Schulz, Riding the Nuclear Tiger: "The Search for Security in 
South Asia," Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, No.5 (June 1993), pp. 3-8; Brahma 
Chellany, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, 
Vol. 16, No.1 (Summer 1991), p. 58. 
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and control structure. 117 Internal disorder and fractious 
poli tics of respective governments frustrate consensus on 
nuclear weapons and deterrence. Despite the lack of admission 
of a nuclear capability there is some evidence that nuclear 
deterrence does operate between the two countries. 
2. Nuclear Deterrence 
Deterrence between India and Pakistan is culturally 
unique and deliberately ambiguous. lIB "Non-weaponized 
deterrence" is one term used to describe the type of 
deterrence at work. 119 It is distinctly non-western in that 
deterrence flows from the ability to rapidly construct nuclear 
weapons rather than having them deployed in a high state of 
readiness .120 It operates predominantly on the psychological 
basis of fear and uncertainty rather than the physical basis 
of credibility. In that manner, it is a type of existential 
117For an analysis of command and control in emergent nuclear powers see: 
Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," pp. 160-187. 
II~Cohen describes the Indian and Pakistani nuclear status as, 
"historically unprecedented," in regards to their "designed ambiguity." 
Stephen Phillip Cohen, ed., "Policy Implications," in Stephen Phillip Cohen, 
Nuclear Proliferation in south Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), p. 340. 
II"George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy, 
No. 91, (Summer 1993), p. 85-104. 
I~OTwo papers that highlight the difference between Western and Eastern 
perceptions of deterrence are: K. Subrahmanyam, "Nuclear Policy, Arms Control 
and Military Cooperation," paper presented at the conference on India and the 
United States after the Cold War, Sponsored by the India International Centre 
and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New Delhi, March 7-9, 
1993, pp 5-7; K. Subrahmanyam, "The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 
Past, Present & Future: A South Asian Perspective on the Management of Nuclear 
Weapons and Strategies for Peace in the Region," unpublished paper prepared 
for The American Academy of Arts and Sciences and The Albert Einstein Peace 
Prize Foundation. no date, pp. 1-36. 
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deterrence. 1n Knowledge of a weapon or a technology 
demonstration as a deterrent is not a notion that could take 
root in the west. 122 Western concepts stress ambiguity of 
intent rather than capability. 123 
India's 1974 explosion and Pakistan's 1992 admission 
of a nuclear capability has forced many experts to conclude 
that the Indian subcontinent has been proliferated -ith 
nuclear weapons. 124 The resultant is that India and Pakistan 
behave as if each has the capacity to introduce nuclear 
weapons in an open conflict should their vital interests be 
threatened. 
1:1 The linkage between opaque proliferation which characterizes the 
region and existential deterrence can be found in: Devin T. Hagerty "The Power 
of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South 
Asian Nuclear Arms Competition," Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3/4 
(Spring/Summer 1993) pp. 264-270. 
1::Even with the diverging notions of the requirements of deterrence in 
the West none disagree on the necessity of a deployable and secure second 
strike force. In stark contrast, "an Indian strategic analyst, Dr Manoj 
Joshi, has developed the thesis that technology demonstration can be projected 
as a deterrent." K. Subrahmanyam, "Nuclear Theology," Economic Times, 13 July 
1993. 
I~Some measure of credibility is required for deterrence to work. This 
is provided by Western political and academic processes. Pakistan's 
unwillingness to risk a nuclear test means that it is, "compelled to create 
crisis situations in which it could highlight its nuclear capability and 
thereby claim nuclear equality with India." K. Subrahmanyan, "Nuclear Policy, 
Arms Control and Military Cooperation," paper presented at the conference on 
India and the United States after the Cold War, sponsored by the Indian 
International Centre and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New 
Delhi, March 7-9, 1993, pp. 14. 
I~Pakistan's nuclear admission without retraction came in 1992. R. 
Jeffrey Smith, "Pakistan Can build One Nuclear Device, 
Foreign Official Says," Washington Post, February 7, 1992 p. A18; Paul Lewis, 
"Pakistan Tells of its A-Bomb Capacity," New York Times, February 8 1992, p. 
5. 
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D. MODERN CONFLICT ON THE SUBCONTINENT 
1. The Siachen Glacier 
The Siachen glacier conflict began because of vague 
borders between India and Pakistan. 125 Battle was joined on 
June of 1984 when patrols inadvertently crossed each others 
paths. Violence on the glacier peaked in 1987 when Indian 
forces stood off three Pakistani brigade strength attacks at 
the Bilafond La mountain pass. Meetings between heads of 
state have failed to find a way out of the sporadic episodes 
of low-level border violence. Violence on the glacier has 
corresponded with conflict and political tension in more 
hospitable climates. Civil unrest in Kashmir in 1990 derailed 
demilitarization plans for the glacier. While not significant 
in terms of interests at stake, Siachen represents an 
unwillingness or inability to disengage .126 In effect, Siachen 
is a contest of will in which the determination of each state 
is continuously evaluated. Disengagement from this relatively 
insignificant battlefield, no matter how desirable, may 
inadvertently signal a willingness to concede on more 
important issues. 
':5The or~g~ns of the Siachen glacier war and efforts to terminate it can 
be found in: "Cold War Ends," The Economist, Vol. 32, No. 7612, 22 July 1989, 
pp. 31-32. 
,:r'Ending the ongoing Siachen conflict is viewed by the United States as 
a symbolic step towards normalizing relations between Pakistan and India. 
Siachen is viewed in the West as a potential catalyst for greater conflict. 
"The Subcontinent's Own Cold War," The Economist, Vol 329, No. 7843, 25 
December 1993, pp 43-44. 
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2. The 1986-87 Brass Tacks Exercise 
In late 1986 India staged one of the largest military 
exercises in its history. Held in the Rajasthan desert near 
the border of the Pakistani province of Sind, the exercise was 
theoretically poised to strike into the heart of Pakistan. 127 
Verbal assurances that India harbored no hostile intent were 
inadequate and each state found itself escalating troop 
placements.1:'8 Officials, "expressed alarm that an accidental 
shot by either side could lead to full-scale fighting. ,,129 
The Pakistani counter to the Brass Tacks exercise, was 
it's Zarb-e-Momin (Punch of the Believer) exercise. It was 
designed to carry a "dissuasive" message to India and test a 
new military doctrine called "defensive-offensive war. ,,130 The 
I~ For an Indian perspective on the Brass Tacks exercise, see: "Game of 
Br inkmanship," India Today, Vol. 12, No.3, 15 
February 1987, pp. 8-14. 
I~Cohen has suggested that one of the objectives of Brass Tacks was to 
frighten Pakistan. He also warns of the political and military detriments of 
such large scale exercises. Stephen Phillip Cohen, "Security, Peace and 
Stability in South Asia: An American Perspective," Asian Affairs, Vol. 15, No 
1 (Spring 1988), p. 45. 
I~Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal 
of Social Issues, Vol. 43, No.4, (Winter 1987), p. 51. 
13""According to the Pakistani army, for the first time it feels well 
equipped to defend national territory adequately and carry the war into enemy 
areas. The army feels confident that it is in a position not to wait for 
India to attack but to launch an offensive as soon as the governments go ahead 
is received." Salamat Ali, "The Counter-punch," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 146, No. 43, 26 October 1989, pp. 25. Cohen stated in an interview that 
both nations had moved to a strategy of "offensive defense." Shekar Gupta and 
Kanwar Sandhu, "Defense: Are We Prepared?" India Today, 30 June 1990, pp. 3l. 
Peter Lavoy rejects the no~ion of offensive-defense on the subcontinent for 
three reasons: Neither state has exposed allies or foreign possessions, 
territorial ambitions beyond Kashmir, or expansionist political aims. Peter R. 
Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and Stability of Nuclear 
Deterrence in South Asia," paper prepared for The Project on Civil-Military 
Relations and Nuclear Weapons, Center for International Security and Arms 
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exercise integrated Pakistan's Air Force and featured river 
crossings to simulate breaching India's network of defensive 
canals. 
3. The 1990 Kashmir Crisis 
There is speculation that India and Pakistan nearly 
brought nuclear force to bear in the 1990 Kashmir Crisis .131 
In this crisis, resurgent Kashmiri separatist groups 
destabilized relations between Islamabad and New Delhi. 132 
Both governments increased their stakes in the violence 
through mobilizations and political rhetoric. India accused 
Pakistan of providing training and heavy weapons to the 
Kashmiri separatists. The Indian Prime Minister stated that 
Pakistan was trying to gain Indian Kashmir without resorting 
to war and that proof of Pakistani complicity in abetting the 
Control, Stanford University, January 1994 pp. 16-17. More extensive 
development of the offensive defensive war concept can be found in, Jack 
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of 
the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, 
Vol. 9, No.1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. 
13ISeymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, March 29, 1993, 
pp. 56-73; "Bush Sending 3 Aides to Assist on Kashmir," New York Times, 16 May 
1990, Sec. A, pp. 9; "U.S. Urges Pakistan to Settle Feud with India over 
Kashmir," New York Times, 21 May 1990, Sec. A, pp. 7. 
'~For a historical perspective on the Kashmir conflict see: Ganguly 
"Avoiding War," pp. 57-73. "KASHMIR is at war with India. It is a declared 
war with open moral, financial, and logistical support from Pakistan." 
Inderjit Badhwar, "Perilous Turn" India Today, Vol. 1, No.2, 30 April 1990, 
pp. 10-16. "Pakistanis are pleased that unlike 1965, when Pakistan first tried 
and failed to foment an uprising in Kashmir, the current uprising is purely 
indigenous." Jammu and Kashmir: The View from Pakistan, Jane's Defence Weekly, 
Vol. 13, No.7, 17 February 1990, p. 299. 
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insurgency existed. 133 The intensity of the uprising and the 
possibility of direct Pakistani military intervention caused 
the Indians to deploy three divisions to Kashmir and one to 
the Pun jab. 134 
Pakistan issued its own inflammatory statements and 
pledged ideological fealty to the insurgency. It accused 
India of massing a strike force 80 kilometers from the border 
in Rajasthan desert for the purpose of destroying Kashmiri 
"freedom fighter" camps. 135 Islamabad reasserted its moral 
claim to the region and devised a political-military strategy 
so that they would not drift inadvertently into war .136 
Nuclear signalling in the 1990 crisis was subtle. 
Sources speculate that the national intelligence assets of the 
Soviet union and united States witnessed the nuclear 
preparations of India and Pakistan and transferred that 
I~For an Indian perspective on the 1990 Kashmir crisis, see: "War 
Games," India Today, Vol. 15, No.4, 28 February 1990, pp. 14-21; "Defence: 
Are We Prepared?" India Today, Vol. 1 No.6, 30 June 1990, pp. 30-38. 
I~In an Interview with V. P. Singh, the Indian Prime Minister 
acknowledged the change from normal routine during the crisis by stating, " 
Pakistani forces have moved to the border. All their radars are operational. 
They've moved them to the Front. Their forward air bases are all operational, 
which is only done at time of war." Interview/V. P. Singh, Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol 148, No. 20, 17 March 1990, pp. 10. 
1,IJames Clad and Salamat Ali, "Will Words Lead to War?" Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 48, No.7, 26 April 1990, p. 11. 
1"'The possibility exists that much of the aid rendered to Muslim 
militants in Kashmir and Sikh separatists in the Punjab 
is not supplied through the central Pakistani government but through Nawaz 
Sharif, the Chief Minister of Pakistan'S Punjab Province and political rival 
to Mrs Bhutto. P. Lewis Young, "The Threat of War over Kashmir," Asian Defence 
Journal (August 1990), p. 15. For a Pakistani account of the war in Kashmir 
and expressions of military confidence see: "In Torn Kashmir, Frontier Is 
Aflame Once More," New York Times, 16 November 1990, Sec. A, p. 4. 
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information to the adversaries. 137 The Hindu fundamentalist 
party, a significant and the most confrontational portion of 
India's coalition government urged strikes into Pakistani 
controlled Kashmir and overt nuclear weaponization. Raja 
Ramanna, the father of the Indian atomic bomb, was appointed 
to the position of Minister of State for Defense emphasized 
the higher priority given to Indian nuclear programs .138 
The Kashmir crisis ended when both sides were satisfied as 
to the defensive preparations of their respective 
mobilizations and agreed to phased withdrawals of forces from 
the region. 139 
4. Low-level War 
"India and Pakistan regularly engage in Mid- to Low-
intensity warfare and frequently find themselves in tense 
In Hersh cites a u.s. intelligence analyst who asserts that the 
Pakistanis had nuclear-armed F-16's prepared to launch. Hersh, "On the 
Nuclear Edge," p. 65. The German magazine Der Spiegel published a report in 
July 1989 that Pakistan was wind tunnel testing nuclear bomb casings for their 
F-16's., see: Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 106. "The Sunday Times 
(London) reported that the Soviet Union had warned the United States of 
India's readying of its nuclear arsenal." Young, "The Threat of War," p. 14. 
1'""Echoes of War," The Economist, Vol. 314, No. 7639, 27 January 1990, 
p. 38. 
1J')Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates suggests that his visit 
to New Delhi and Islamabad helped to defuse the crisis, see: Hersh, "On the 
Nuclear Edge," pp. 56-73. Indian accounts of the events differ, in that the 
crisis was averted by U.S. embassy officials who observed the defensive 
preparations of the Indian army and relayed that information to Islamabad 
prior to Gates involvement, see: General V. N. Sharma, "Its all Bluff and 
Bluster," Economic Times, 18 May 1993, p. 13 and K. Subrahmanyam, "Valuable 
Inferences," Economic Times, 18 May 1993, p. 13. A Pakistani TV broadcast of 
a joint Indo-Pakistani agreement to cut troops along the borders emphasizes 
the role of reassurance in crisis diffusion, "Pakistan Reports agreement with 
India on Cutting Troops," New York Times, 23 December 1990, Sec. I, p. 3. 
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--------------~----------________________________________ ....J 
circumstances. ,,14" In terna tionally supported terrorists, their 
increasing sophistication, and elusiveness provides a unique 
mode of deterrence failure between opposing nuclear powers. 
Terrorists in both countries have taken on highly visible 
targets and exercised considerable autonomy.141 Cultural 
animosity provides another unique trigger for direct military 
conflict. Anti-Muslim activities, which have achieved 
political respectability in the Hindu fundamentalist party, 
act as a catalyst for conflict .142 
The mutual fear of big wars has, in fact, spawned a 
spate of smaller ones. Low-level violence is an accepted 
feature on the subcontinent. Violence over Kashmir is equal 
or greater than at any other point in their history. Pakistan 
and India have realized that it is less costly to engage in a 
subversive and largely clandestine war than to engage in 
I-"'Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and 
Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," 
paper prepared for The Project on Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear 
Weapons, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford 
University, (January 1994), pp. 21. 
'·'paul Levanthal and Brahma Chellaney, "Nuclear Terror ism: Threat, 
Perception, and Response in South Asia," Terrorism, Vol. 11, No.6, (1988), p. 
456. 
1·:"The upsurge of Hindu-Muslim animosity throughout South Asia following 
the destruction of the Ayoda mosque has heightened the danger of war between 
India and Pakistan that could escalate to the nuclear level." Selig S. 
Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp, India and America after the Cold War, Report of 
the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on U.S.-Indian relations in a Changing 
International environment (Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1993), p. 2. For more information on Indian internal 
politics, see James C. Clad, "India: Crisis and transition," The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No.1 (Winter 1992), pp. 91-104). 
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direct military action. 143 Despite the mode of warfare, the 
objectives of the hypothetical big war, the incorporation of 
Kashmir, and the actual small war remain the same. The advent 
of nuclear deterrence on the subcontinent has not provided a 
rationale for disengagement or compromise. Nuclear weapons 
have created a comfortable retreat and each party has settled 
into a tolerable level of violence. 
E. CONCLUSION 
None of the post-1971 war events erupted into open 
conflict. While this indicates a reasonable degree of 
prudence between states it also illustrates how internal 
events can reach dangerous levels of provocation over a 
territorial interest. It would appear that India and Pakistan 
have learned to step back from large wars safely and routinely 
and to accommodate themselves to a level of violence that 
would have been intolerable prior to a nuclear threat. The 
first Kashmiri war began with 2000 guerrilla fighters crossing 
the border with light arms. India faces at least a threat of 
equal magnitude from Pakistani supported insurgents today. 
The mutual acceptance of this level of violence is evidence of 
the stability-instability paradox at work. South Asian 
nuclear deterrence may have reduced the risk of bold and 
'4J"The Case Against War," p. 34. "Pakistan has found that fighting a 
proxy war through insurgents is cheaper, safer and more effective than a real 
war." "Kashmir's Proxy War," The Economist, Vol. 324, No. 7774, 29 August 
1992, p. 29. 
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decisive conventional action but has little effect on less 
aggressive options. In this respect India and Pakistan have 
diverged from the precedent set by the Soviet Union and China 
which chose direct and overt conventional conflict as their 
mode of settlement. While these lesser strategies may be more 
viable, the stability-instability paradox, does not 
unequivocally preclude the use of bold and aggressive action. 
Decisive action under the cover of nuclear weapons is not 
inconceivable and is of some concern to strategists. 
Some Pakistani and many Indian strategists argue 
that such a Pakistani bomb, besides neutralizing an 
assumed Indian nuclear force, would provide the 
umbrella under which Pakistan could reopen the 
Kashmir issue. A Pakistani nuclear capability 
would paralyze not only the Indian nuclear decision 
but also Indian conventional forces, and a bold 
Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go 
unchallenged if Indian leadership was indecisive. 144 
India and Pakistan find themselves in the discouraging 
position of being unable to make a lasting peace or being able 
to wage a decisive war. Both states are committed to 
achieving ends the other is sworn to prevent and the result is 
incipient crisis. Nonproliferation and deterrence logic can 
1··Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, (Berkeley: The University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 153. Despite this statement, Cohen asserts that 
Pakistani nuclear weapons are not intended as covers or fallbacks for 
aggressive action but rather as, "protective insurance, the legitimate 
response of a relatively weak power." Perception, Influence and Weapons 
Proliferation in South Asia, report prepared for the State Department, Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research (#1722-920184, August 1978), p. 24. The 
possibility of using nuclear weapons to re-energize the Kashmir issue has been 
communicated in India. Cohen's statement has been quoted in K. Subrahmanyam, 
"A Bomb We Cannot Ignore," Times of India, Sunday Review, 18 March 1984. 
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both be comfortably adapted to the Indo-Pakistani rivalry but 
neither captures the day to day reality of relations between 
the two states. They are of little use in describing routine 
operations between states which exist on the verge of crisis. 
with a nuclear backstop guaranteeing ultimate safety neither 
nation has a compelling reason for compromise. 145 Neither 
country can retreat from the level of violence that is a 
permanent feature of their existence for fear of signaling 
weakness nor can they move in a decisive military fashion to 
end the bloodshed. 
'~Pakistan cannot, "credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons in Kashmir 
itself or even in the neighboring Punjab to pursue its irredentist claim to 
the state. By the same token, India can ill afford to threaten Pakistan with 
nuclear weapons to deter if from its present course of action in Kashmir." 
Sum it Ganguly, "South Asia after the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
15, No.4 (Autumn 1992), p. 177. 
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VI. THE PROMETHEAN PARADOX 
According to Greek myth, the Titan Prometheus stole fire 
from the gods and gave it mankind. His act at once liberated 
man and cursed it -and so it is with nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
weapons may have freed their possessors from the fear of the 
cataclysmic war only to be condemned to a plethora of small 
ones. 
This thesis has examined one aspect of the argument that 
nuclear proliferation enhances strategic stability by breeding 
caution among the possessors of nuclear weapons. It has 
presented the existing literature on the logic of deterrence, 
the logic of nonproliferation, and the stability-instability 
paradox. The cases examined established the conditions that 
result in small conventional wars between nuclear-armed 
adversaries. They are: a strategic nuclear stalemate, a 
territorial interest, and employable conventional forces. 
Strategic nuclear stalemate implies several beliefs among 
the actors. Both sides must believe they cannot afford a 
full-scale war and that the other side believes the same. The 
territorial interest implies that the interest at stake is 
sufficiently important for both sides to fight over but not 
enough to risk mutual nuclear suicide. Interests were 
revealed to be a critical factor in the decision to resort to 
64 
war. The final condition is that states must have employable 
conventional forces at their disposal. 
In the case of the united states versus the Soviet Union, 
conflict was primarily ideologically based. This case 
demonstrates that an important factor in the operation of the 
stability-instability paradox is a territorial interest. The 
united States and the Soviet union never engaged in a contest 
of wills over contiguous piece of territory. In each of the 
crises in the case the injection of credible conventional 
forces into the arena of conflict was problematic at best. 
While nuclear weapons played a role in the decision-making 
processes, nuclear strategy or nuclear superiority had little 
bearing on whether a challenge was issued. The level of 
provocation became greater as nuclear capabilities achieved 
congruence. This cases most important contribution is that it 
demonstrates when nuclear-armed adversaries will not resort to 
direct conventional violence. 
The Soviet Union versus the People's Republic of China was 
different in that the interest at stake was primarily 
peripheral territory. The Chinese aggressors were emboldened 
by their developing nuclear capability. While the Chinese 
were vastly inferior in the amount of nuclear force they could 
bring to bear against the Soviets, the Soviets did not have a 
guaranteed preemptive capability. Both sides had conventional 
forces in place and mechanisms for rapid reinforcement. 
India versus Pakistan is a particularly good test for the 
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paradox. The States are relatively recent additions to the 
international system as sovereign actors and have an extensive 
history of conflict. The contested interest, like the Soviet 
union versus China, is primarily territorial. Their ability 
to bring conventional force to bear is evidenced by their 
history of warfare and low-level conflict. Both countries are 
unique from the other case studies in that they have an 
ambiguous nuclear capability. In a manner, the Indians and 
Pakistanis have achieved congruence in nuclear capabilities 
almost instantaneously. While neither country admits to a 
nuclear weapons capability, they have both issued nuclear 
threats during periods of extreme stress. Both India and 
Pakistan behave as if they could each introduce nuclear 
weapons in short order should war break out. Nuclear 
deterrence can be said to be working on the sub-continent. 
Another unique feature of violence between India and 
Pakistan that diverges from the Soviet and Chinese case is the 
patterns of violence. The pattern established by the Indo-
Pakistani wars demonstrates an increasing capability to 
inflict damage on each other. Previous wars and more recent 
crises indicate that conventional mobilizations are not 
difficult. Exercises involving tens of thousands of men have 
occurred. While conventional war is possible, subversive 
guerilla wars and geographically isolated conflict have 
developed into the most prevalent form of violence. These 
lesser modes of violence may be exactly the sort of smaller 
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wars that Waltz postulated. It is a reasonable supposition to 
suggest nuclear weapons have moved conflict between India and 
Pakistan to the remote geographic regions such as the Siachen 
glacier and the lower reaches of provocation, such as 
clandestine subversive wars. This is roughly analogous to the 
proxy wars fought by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The cases suggest a possible rational for the use of 
conventional force between nuclear-armed adversaries. Under 
conditions of mutual vulnerability nuclear weapons may 
facilitate the decision to resort to violence by providing a 
rational limitation to the level of escalation that states are 
willing to risk. with a nuclear backstop guaranteeing 
absolute security, employable conventional forces, and a 
territorial interest at stake, nuclear-armed powers can engage 
in direct conventional conflict of one form or the other. 
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